



**PELEUS**  
STUDIEN ZUR ARCHÄOLOGIE UND  
GESCHICHTE GRIECHENLANDS UND ZYPERNS  
BAND 22

# **Cyprus and Europe**

## **The Long Way Back**

Edited by

**Vassilis K. Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter**



**BIBLIOPOLIS**  
**Mannheim und Möhnesee 2003**

## PELEUS

### Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns

Herausgegeben von Reinhard Stupperich und Heinz A. Richter

Band 22

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP Einheitsaufnahme

*Cyprus and Europe: the Long Way Back* / edited by Vassilis Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter; Möhnese: Bibliopolis, 2003 (Peleus; Bd. 22)  
ISBN 3-933925-41-X

Cover vignettes:

Front Cover: Silver stater of the ancient Cypriot city-kingdom of Marion, portraying the abduction of Europa by Zeus transformed into a bull, end of 5th Century BC.

Opposite title page: Cup by the Peithinos painter, Berlin, Pergamonmuseum (CVA Berlin 2, Taf. 61).

Copyright Bibliopolis 2003

Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlags ist es nicht gestattet, das Buch oder Teile daraus auf fotomechanischem Wege zu vervielfältigen.

Gesamtherstellung: Druck Partner Rübelmann GmbH, Carl-Benz-Str. 11, 69 502 Hemsbach

BIBLIOPOLIS

D - 59519 Möhnese-Wamel, Schulpatt 13

Tel. 02924/2781, Fax 02924/2757, e-mail: bibliopolis@web.de

www.bibliopolis.de

ISBN 3-933925-41-X

## Content

Introduction: Cyprus and Europe by Heinz A. Richter .....	7
Diana Weston Markides Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty .....	11
George Leventis Cyprus Stays under UK Sovereignty: the Debate in the British Government, 1945-47 .....	23
Suha Bolukbasi From Benevolent Detachment to Reluctant Assertiveness: Turkey's Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-2001 .....	33
Brendan O'Malley Victims and Villains: the Influence of Foreign Military Interests and Ethnic Fighting on the Division of Cyprus .....	51
Claude Nicolet Anglo-American Relations and the End of Colonialism in Cyprus ....	61
Vassilis K. Fouskas US Foreign Policy in the Greater Middle East during the Cold War and the Position of Cyprus .....	73
William Mallinson Cyprus between the EU and NATO: Abject Object of International Relations .....	89
Mehmet Ugur EU Membership and the North-South Development Gap in Cyprus: A Proposal .....	121
Christopher Brewin The Cyprus Question in EU-Turkey Relations .....	133
Andreas Theophanous Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution .....	141
Heinz A. Richter The Policy of Ankara towards Cyprus and the EU .....	159
Stelios Stavrides The International Role of the Cypriot Parliament (Vouli ton Antiprosopon) and Cyprus' Accession to the EU .....	173
Conclusion: The Long Way Back by Vassilis K. Fouskas .....	205
Contributors .....	211

## Introduction

The title of this book, *Cyprus and Europe: the Long Way Back*, and the 2,500 years old Cypriot coin from Marion on the front cover depicting Zeus and Europa, contain a message: Cyprus once was part of Europe and, after more than two millenia, is becoming a member of the European family again. There is no doubt that, geographically speaking, the island of Cyprus has never belonged to Europe. But my remarks do not refer to geography. Rather, they refer to Cyprus's ancestral European culture. This drives me to formulate two questions: first, what characterizes Europe culturally? Second, is the culture of Cyprus compatible with Europe's own?

When Huntington wrote his famous *The Clash of Civilizations*, he assumed that the orthodox world in East and Southeastern Europe did not belong to the European culture but constituted an independent cultural unit. I can now slightly modify my questions: What is a European culture and in what ways do Europeans and non-Europeans alike differ? Moreover, why are the orthodox Europeans not Europeans?

In the early thirties the Spanish cultural philosopher Ortega y Gasset wrote in his essay, "Upheaval of the Masses", that the Europeans are a unique mixture of Graeco-Roman philosophy and Christianity, which moulded their ethical, moral, religious, legal and cultural ideas. If we add to this some Jewish and Arab elements the picture becomes complete. Despite of all our national differences, we have a European identity which is based on our joint culture, religion, history, customs and way of life, law, political culture and universal values. There is no doubt that all Europeans from Brest to the Ural, from the North Cape to Sicily share the universal Graeco-Roman heritage. But what are the specific elements which cause the differences between the Europeans of the west, north, centre and those of the southeast? In order to simplify the discussion, I deliberately brush aside the differences with the Russian orthodox world. Instead, I concentrate on southeastern European developments.

Until 1500, there is no doubt that, culturally, the two parts of Europe had not drifted apart decisively, bar the schism between the orthodox and the catholic churches. But in 1453 the Ottomans conquered Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire which had lasted for one thousand years came to an end. A few years later, the Ottomans came to control the Balkans and detached it from Europe so thoroughly that one is inclined to speak of a kind of a first 'iron curtain'. On the southeastern side of the curtain time stood still for three hundred years and, in some areas, for even longer.

The rest of Europe followed a different developmental path. The epidemic plague of the 14<sup>th</sup> century had shaken the religious foundations of the west so deeply that people began searching for new mental and spiritual orientations. At the same time a great number of freedom loving Greek intellectuals from Constantinople sought refuge in the west, bringing with them the advanced knowledge of Byzantium. These two movements (and others) led to the Renaissance on the one hand, recalling the classical heritage, and to the Reformation of western Christianity on the other. The ensuing religious wars between Catholics and Protestants questioned the role of the churches and provoked further changes. Religion was increasingly replaced by rationalism; the concept of absolutism was the respite for the state and individualism for the human being. The influence of Calvinism with its new ethical norms permitted the ascent of a new social class, the bourgeoisie. During the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the concept of the universal human rights was developed; Rousseau added the principle of the national state based upon the people's sovereignty (government by consent of the governed),

the idea of the freedom of the individual and its right to participate in government. These concepts became integral parts of European understanding of politics. During the same time, new liberal, democratic, socialist, conservative and nationalist ideas came into being and influenced politics. The right-left cleavage became an accepted pattern of European politics. Gradually, political pluralism assumed a central place in Europe's political culture. Another aspect was the separation of the church from the state: Religion from now on belonged to the private realm of the citizen, his/her public life being regulated by the state. It took some three hundred years to develop the main components of this system which, essentially, was confined to western and central Europe.

The part of southeastern Europe outside the Habsburg monarchy did not participate in this liberalisation and modernization process. Quite the opposite, certain medieval structures became not only dominant, but they were also strengthened: under to the Ottoman *millet* system, all Christian Churches (Orthodox, Armenian, Coptic etc.) increased their influence. Up to a certain degree, their prelates shared the state's power with the Ottomans. In Cyprus, for instance, the Archbishop became *Ethnarch*, leader of his people. On the other hand, the leaders of the church managed to preserve the identity of their folk as Greeks, Armenians or Copts, and saved them from assimilation by the Moslem environment.

Another important feature of the Ottoman Empire was the *muchtars* system. As the pre-Ottoman oligarchy was either exterminated or converted to Islam, thus losing the direct influence over the local Christian population, the elected village headmen, the 'muchtars', took their place instead. They had a double function: they became leaders and patrons of the local population, as well as objects of Ottoman repression if something went wrong. A patron-client-structure emerged which became a defining feature of the Ottoman state.

When in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century the first national insurrections against the Ottomans took place in Serbia and Greece, these clientelistic nuclei became the kernel of the revolutionary movements. And when independence came, these structures, being the only existing ones, grew horizontally and vertically in society and politics. At the same time they refined themselves into wider political networks. Clientelism became the basic political system of rule of all the successor states of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. It is political clientelism and not Orthodoxy as Huntingdon believes, which makes the difference between southeastern and western Europe. And it is this Ottoman heritage which has made the road of the Balkan countries back to the European fold so difficult.

The Balkan enlightenment in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries began to close the abyss between the two parts of Europe. Yet the process seems not to have reached its end, as is shown by the recent quarrel between the Church and the State in Greece about the insertion of religious confession on the ID cards. But one feature of the time of the Ottomans has survived: political clientelism. The political parties do not commit themselves to concrete political programmes that express the will of their members. Rather, the political game is defined by a highly refined clientelistic network led by few patrons on the basis of *rousfetia*. In other words: In southeastern Europe there is a different political culture, which differs fundamentally from the western one. These countries can only be accepted and integrated into the EU if they manage to adapt their political culture to EU norms and standards. To appreciate how painful this process is, we have been able to watch at the example of Greece, which is still labouring to get rid of this part of the Ottoman past. From this perspective, the next enlargement of the EU will be very interesting, and I am sure it will cause Brussels many headaches.

This brings me back to the original question concerning the compatibility of the Cypriot political culture with Europe's own. When Cyprus was accepted as a candidate country, some critical voices in Europe were mistakenly quick to compare Cyprus with Greece, which at the time of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, often appeared as difficult if not a nuisance. But when Greece under Simitis proved to be a reliable partner, critical voices were reduced considerably. Thus when the decisive EU summit at Copenhagen came closer, no rumours against the entry of Cyprus were heard. Apparently the Europeans were of the opinion that the Cypriots would integrate into Europe without any difficulties.

This assumption was not based on detailed information about Cyprus; the explanation is simpler. The Europeans had watched how easily the Cypriots had fulfilled the obligations of the *acquis communautaire*; indeed, among the new candidates, Cyprus was the model pupil. But this does not answer our question. Is it possible that the old Ottoman structure of clientelism will re-surface within the EU?

On the basis of my more than two decades long intimate experience with the inhabitants of the island I flatly deny this. Undoubtedly, the Cypriots belong to the Greek and Turkish cultural patterns, but at the same time both ethnic groups identify themselves more with Western European than with the so-called mother countries. The political culture of the Cypriots is significantly different from that of Greece and Turkey and the rest of the European countries which had belonged to the Ottoman Empire: There is almost no visible sign of clientelism. This is so amazing that it calls for an explanation.

When the British acquired Cyprus in 1878, they found the structures as we know them from the Balkan countries before their struggle for independence. But as in Cyprus there was never a war of independence against the Ottomans, the clientelistic nuclei did not form horizontal and vertical networks. And when the British took over, they very quickly built up their administrative structures bypassing the *muchtars*. The patrons received their share in power when the British created the Legislative Council. It is true that these patrons were the same merchants, big landowners, lawyers and usurers which became the patrons in Greece, but the British never allowed the state to become a prey for them. They could do small *rousfetia* but the British administration had the final say and there was no money in the island due to the so-called Ottoman Tribute, which might have allowed greater *rousfetia* and the creation of clientelistic networks.

When finally in the 1920s investment capital was needed for the encumberment and modernization of the agriculture there was a chance for the moneylenders but the British ruined it by creating the agricultural cooperative movement and the agricultural bank. As their interest were always of a lower level than those of the moneylenders clientelism died before it had a chance to grow.

It is amusing, however, that the Cypriots believe that they have clientelism on their island. The examples they mention as proofs are the old phenomena of favouritism, nepotism, wheeling and dealing, corruption etc., well known features of European politics. Only when they are confronted with the sophisticated clientelistic structures of their mother countries the Cypriots begin to understand that the above mentioned negative appearances are not clientelism. Moreover, they are exceptions and not the rule and are operating not in a tightly closed, exclusive system, but in an open one.

The political parties of Cyprus resemble their European counterparts. They have programmes and democratic structures and suffer of cronyism as our parties do. Deputies are

not managers and distributors of rousfetia. Protectionism exists as in Europe but corruption is not a pardonable sin or a mass sport. It is a violation of the law and is punished as it violates a code of honour taken over from the British – ‘a gentleman does not do such a thing’.

The Auditor General is a highly respected person and his influence makes a German face turn green with envy. The office of the Ombudsman is similarly respected. The Cypriot society preserved the British ideal of a civic society much more than Great Britain herself, but the Cypriot society is not simply a copy of the British. It is a lively, mediterranean society, sometimes even impetuous and target oriented: muddling through is not a Cypriot concept. When more than ten years ago the Cypriots decided that they wanted to join the EU, they went to work systematically to rebuild their society so that they would meet European requirements. And there is another non-British aspect of Cypriot society: it is not a class society, there are almost no class barriers there. I am tempted to define Cypriot society as a model civic society.

Religion is a private affair; interventions by the church in public life increasingly lead to negative reactions. Similar reaction can be observed in the north of the island. The Turkish Cypriot society is an enlightened society and Islamic fundamentalism is incompatible with Turkish Cypriot thinking. Until 1974 both societies resembled each other very much but the invasion triggered developments which became dangerous for the Turkish Cypriots and their political culture. The Anatolian settlers did not only change the demographic balance but they brought with them Turkish clientelistic attitudes. Denktash immediately understood their value, adopted them and based his rule on clientelism distributing *rousfetia* in an Ottoman way. The opposition parties do not have access to the subsidies paid by Turkey. Subsequently, they had scarce incentives to ‘clientelise’ their structures.

On the basis of what has been said so far, I think that our initial question has been answered. The political culture of Cyprus is compatible with Europe’s own, and this holds true for both Cypriot societies. The entry of Cyprus into the EU will be a gain for Europe and for both ethnic groups living in Cyprus. The title of our book makes justice to Cyprus’s European history over the millenia: Cyprus was once and is becoming again a European country in the most modern sense of the word. That is to say Cyprus, in 2004, will duly return to the fold of modern European nations.

The idea for this book was conceived during a conference in London. Vassilis Fouskas has made a formal book proposal to publish the papers of a conference on ‘Cyprus and the EU’, which he had organized at Kingston University in May 2001. As his collection of articles appeared so attractive, we have accepted his proposal, suggesting to Vassilis to publish it as a PELEUS volume at Bibliopolis. He agreed and we added a few more articles and did the editorial work together via the internet. Our project lasted almost a year and Vassilis proved to be a very reliable, punctual co-editor who made things easy for me and I want to thank him cordially. Thus, we can proudly present to the public a new volume of the Peleus series, containing a kind of *tour d’horizon* of Cypriot history from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the road to Europe was opened, to all the long way back to Europe, ending in December 2002 at Copenhagen, when Cyprus was accepted as a member of the European family.

Heinz A. Richter

## Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty

Diana Weston Markides

### Introduction

A major ingredient in the troubles that have afflicted the small Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been uncertainty about the future. Through the years, the perennial uncertainty has encouraged interested parties within and outside the island to invest in the possibility of achieving their preferred future status. Consequent contingency planning has led to mistrust and suspicion. Eventual ethnic conflict was inherent in this mistrust, for it gradually undermined the traditional interdependent relationship between the two religious communities on the island. Until 1878 Cyprus remained a province of the Ottoman Empire. The mix of population was scarcely unusual for an island in the Eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the century - a majority of Greek Christians who made up 73% of the population and a minority of Moslems, who made up 24.4%, with a sprinkling of Armenians, Maronites and Latins. In modern times, a similar ratio (80%:18%) has become something of an anachronism.<sup>1</sup> Until recently, the Turkish Cypriots lived all over the island in mixed towns and villages. Separatist tendencies that grew in intensity in the 1960s, were solidified after 1974 when the population was forcibly herded into two ethnically-cleansed zones.

This paper will take a long view of the uncertainty factor in this process in order to set the tone for the rest of the contributions in this collection. It will examine its connection to the externality of Cypriot affairs – that is, firstly, the extent to which decisions about the future status of the island have been taken by third parties in their own interests without reference to the Cypriots and, secondly, the external dimension of the two prevalent nationalisms on the island, Greek and Turkish.

### British Rule 1878-1960

**1878-1914: Continuing Ottoman Suzerainty:** 1878 was the year of the great Congress at Berlin, convened to prevent a European war after the rapid Russian advance south to Adrianople. The Russians, now within a few miles away from Constantinople and the Straits, the important stretch of water that provides marine access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, represented a major threat to European peace. These events marked the beginning of the end of Turkey in Europe. In its wake came burgeoning Balkan nationalism and ethnic conflict over territory, not dissimilar to the conflicts in the Balkans today in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then as now, the powers moved in to stabilise the region as they saw fit.<sup>2</sup> Thus, this very early period of British rule sets the scene for the shifting relations of global and regional powers that have provided the context for Cypriot developments ever since.

In the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin, the growing militancy of Balkan nationalism and its tendency to weaken the Ottoman hold on its European provinces had resulted in

<sup>1</sup> 1882 Census. Over 5% of Moslems spoke Greek as their mother tongue in 1881 and nearly 3% in 1931. Until the 1973 census, the population was classified by religion. In 1973 it was classified by race. See L.W. St. John-Jones, *The Population of Cyprus* (London, 1983), pp. 50-52.

<sup>2</sup> See generally M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations 1774-1923* (London: Macmillan, 1966).