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Introduction:
Written Laws in their Ancient Contexts

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The present volume comprises papers that were initially delivered at a conference held at the University of Lausanne in May 2011. The general purpose of the conference was to compare the creation and the transmission of legal collections in ancient Greece and in the ancient near East, including Mesopotamia, Egypt and Israel. The following introduction will briefly present the aims of this volume; outline the contents of its essays; and finally enumerate some of the perspectives they open for future study of ancient written laws and legal collections from a comparative perspective.

1. The Aims of the Present Volume

Ancient laws and legal collections have been the subject of significant scholarly interest in the last few decades.\(^1\) The focus of the conference, however, was more specifically on the comparison between written laws in ancient societies. In the context of predominantly oral societies, whose judiciary was largely defined by unwritten norms and customs, the production, publication and transmission of written laws raise several significant issues for historians. These issues include (but are not restricted to) the relationship between written and unwritten laws; the institutional contexts and authorities involved in the production of these documents; as well as the distinct functions of written laws in the judiciary and their impact on the legal practice of ancient societies. Additionally, from a more theoretical perspective, the study of written laws also raises several important issues regarding the analytical categories used to describe these documents. In particular, a significantly disputed issue is whether, and to what extent, terms like ‘codes’ and ‘codification’ provide relevant descriptors for ancient collections of written laws. This issue has been the subject of a longstanding discussion in the case of Mesopotamian laws,\(^2\) but similar questions have been raised in the case of Greek written laws in recent years.\(^3\) These discussions do not

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1 A comprehensive overview of the scholarly literature on this topic is beyond the scope of the present essay. Among recent publications with a strong comparative component, see, in particular, Lévy (ed.), Codification, as well as Witte and Fögen (eds.), Kodifizierung. Compare also Barta et al. (eds.), Recht und Religion; K. Seybold and J. von Ungern-Sternberg (eds.), Gesetzgebung in antiken Gesellschaften; Lang et al. (eds.), Staatsverträge; Legras (ed.), Transferts culturels et droits; Artus (ed.), Loi et Justice.

2 Among recent publications, compare, e.g., Roth, Law Collection; Westbrook, Codification and Canonization; Démare-Lafont, Codification et subsidiarité; Otto, Kodifizierung und Kanonisierung; Charpin, Le statut des ‘codes de lois’. See also the essay by Sophie Démare-Lafont in this volume.

3 Especially, but not exclusively, in the case of the Gortyn ‘Code’: see, e.g., Davies, Deconstructing Gortyn; van Effenterre, La codification gortynienne. See also the essay by Françoise Ruzé in this volume.
merely highlight the need for terminological clarification and more accurate definitions. They also point, more substantially, to basic disagreements regarding the status and functions ascribed to written laws in antiquity. In the case of cuneiform laws, for instance, the key issue is whether these laws were effectively used in the Mesopotamian judiciary – and if so, where and at which level(s) of that judiciary – or whether they should be regarded as mere literary compositions with no legal force. In the end, therefore, the debates surrounding the use of terms like ‘code’ and ‘codification’ – and other terms as well – take us back to the larger issue of the place of written laws in ancient societies, as well their relation to legal and judicial practice in those societies.

While these and related issues have already been the subject of several studies, these studies have often restricted their investigation to a given culture, like Greece or Mesopotamia (or Mesopotamia and the Levant). Comparative approaches to written laws in the ancient world have been few, and have usually focused on a specific aspect of these laws such as the notion of codification in antiquity, legal and cultural interactions between East and West, or the emergence of an ‘international’ law in the ancient Mediterranean world.

The approach of our conference was somewhat distinctive, and was characterized in particular by two methodological insights that are also reflected in the organization of this volume and therefore deserve a brief comment at this point.

First, the conference sought to promote a contrastive, or ‘differential’ approach to the comparison of ancient laws. This is not to deny the interest and relevance of several recent studies that have focused on possible (mutual) influences between Greek and ancient near Eastern laws, especially in light of the mounting evidence for cultural contacts and borrowings between ancient Mediterranean societies from an early period onward. Alongside this recent trend, however, there is also room for an approach that focuses on the many differences that can be observed between legal traditions of ancient societies. Such an approach has already been theorized in other domains of antiquity, such as especially the comparative study of religion, and it is the contention of

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4 Although this point has not always been given enough attention, it is important to mention that the definition of ‘codification’ is significantly complicated by the fact that there are substantial differences between the usage of this term in modern legal cultures (e.g., American and French), and that these differences impact in turn the ways in which ancient codification is understood and interpreted. Compare, e.g., the approaches to ‘codification’ exemplified by Roth, Law Collection, and by Démare-Lafont, Codification et subsidiarité.

5 The so-called ‘sacred laws’, for instance, are another case in point. See further below.

6 With respect to codification in the ancient world, see, especially, Lévy (ed.), Codification, as well as Witte and Fögen (eds.), Kodifizierung.

7 On this issue, see now especially the essays collected in Legras (ed.), Transferts culturels et droits.

8 On this issue, see, e.g., Bederman, International Law; as well as the various essays collected in Bouineau (ed.), Droit international et Antiquité.

9 Regarding Eastern influences on the formation of Greek laws, see, e.g., Thür, Rechtstransfer. In the case of biblical and Greek laws, see Hagedorn, Between Moses and Plato, as well as Knoppers and Harvey, The Pentateuch in Ancient Mediterranean Context. The definition of categories such as ‘influence’, ‘borrowing’, ‘transfer’ and the like in legal contexts raises several conceptual issues, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this short Introduction. See further Legras (ed.), Transferts culturels et droits; and compare also the relevant remarks by Otto, Rechtstransfer im antiken Mittelmeerraum.

10 See, e.g., Borgeaud, Réflexions sur la comparaison, as well as the essays collected in Calame and Lincoln (eds.), Comparer en Histoire des religions antiques.
the present authors that it can also be fruitfully applied to the study of ancient written laws. To put it succinctly, a ‘differential’ approach to the comparison of ancient laws may help us achieve two related goals: on the one hand, to question or even deconstruct some problematic generalizations in the study of ancient laws (a ‘code’, for instance, does not necessarily mean the same thing in Greece and in Mesopotamia); and on the other, to illuminate the specifics of the social structures and institutional processes involved in the writing of laws in each culture – specifics which often remain insufficiently considered when that culture is studied in isolation from others. We will return to some of these issues in the final part of this Introduction.

Second, as is reflected in this volume’s title, the conference also sought to integrate, or reintegrate, the case of the so-called ‘sacred laws’ in Greece in the discussion of ancient legal collections. The category of ‘sacred laws’ has long been used in the field of classical Greek studies to denote a – more or less homogeneous – body of legal inscriptions whose primary subject matter concerns the ritual practice of various Greek cities. The category is now the subject of considerable discussion among specialists, many of whom would question or even dispute its relevance, although no consensus has emerged so far on an alternative classification. Furthermore, the study of the so-called ‘sacred laws’ has remained largely divorced from other aspects of legal codification in ancient Greece. This situation is understandable, in some regards, not the least because of the distinct subject matter of these laws. In other regards, however, it is nonetheless problematic. The separation between ritual matters and legal matters proper (such as civil law, or criminal law) may be satisfactory for the modern (Western) mind but it does not necessarily correspond to the practices of ancient societies, in which rituals and (more generally) ‘religion’ were embedded in virtually all aspects and dimensions of the life of the city, from the household to popular assemblies. Furthermore, some of the institutional processes and authorities involved in the collection, compilation and publication of the so-called ‘sacred laws’ are at least comparable to – if not identical with – the processes and authorities involved in the creation of other legal collections. To be clear, this is not to deny that the so-called ‘sacred laws’ present many distinctive features, not only in terms of the matter of these inscriptions but also of their genre and their social function. But the assumption of a neat division between ‘sacred laws’ and other types of laws is an issue that needs to be reexamined. Moreover, such a reexamination has broader implications for the rest of the ancient world, where the distinction between ‘ritual’ and ‘legal’ texts is likewise problematic in many cases.

11 See also, in this context, the essay by Anselm Hagedorn in the present volume.
12 For a critical discussion of this category, see Parker, What Are Greek Sacred Laws?, as well as Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge, Beyond Greek ‘Sacred Laws’; most recently, Georgoudi, L’écriture en action. See also the essay by Jean-Mathieu Carbon and Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge in this volume.
13 On the ‘embedded’ character of religion in the case of Athens, which is by far the best documented among Greek cities, see, e.g., the comprehensive study by Parker, Polytheism and Society at Athens. This is not to deny, however, that some delineations between the various domains of human activity were actually enforced, but the mapping of these delineations is arguably significantly more complex than what our modern categories allow for. On this fascinating issue, see especially the essay by Pierre Brulé in this volume.
14 The biblical laws present a fascinating illustration of this phenomenon, as they regularly include ritual norms, especially in the case of the ‘Holiness’ legislation of Leviticus. On the comparison between Greek and Israelite laws from this perspective, see the contribution of Anselm Hagedorn to this volume.
2. An Overview of the Essays in this Volume

In keeping with the methodological perspectives defined above, this volume has been organized in two main parts. Part One, entitled “Codes, Codification and Legislators”, comprises four essays that discuss various key aspects of the processes involved in the creation of legal collections in Mesopotamia, Greece, Israel and Egypt, as well as the relevance of the analytical categories used to describe these processes. Part Two, entitled “Writing Ritual Prescriptions: Meanings and Functions”, includes three essays that address more specific issues related to the codification of ritual norms in Greece and in Israel.

The first essay, by Sophie Démare-Lafont (p. 21–32), addresses the central issue of the relevance of the terms ‘code’ and ‘codification’ applied to the Mesopotamian laws. She begins with a historical retrospect, in which she surveys the origins of the use of these terms for cuneiform laws, the debates surrounding this usage, as well as the meaning of the terms themselves. She remarks, in particular, that the notion of ‘codification’ entails two different aspects – codification as a legal technique and as a legal program – and then proceeds to analyze cuneiform laws from this twofold perspective. With regard to codification as a legal technique, Démare-Lafont identifies three successive stages: the gathering of materials, their organization, and their publication. She argues that all three aspects can be identified in most of the cuneiform collections, such that these collections satisfy the formal requirements of codification. She then discusses various aspects related to cuneiform laws as a legal program, arguing in particular that (a) these laws correspond to an understanding of codification as “compilation” of existing laws; (b) while not exhaustive, they provide a comprehensive set of norms for legal decisions; and (c) the relationship of these laws to local rules and customs corresponds to a principle of subsidiarity, in which the higher judicial level was activated only when legal decisions at the lower levels failed to satisfy one of the parties involved.

The next essay, by Françoise Ruzé (p. 34-49), aptly complements the previous one by providing a comprehensive discussion of codification in ancient Greece. Ruzé begins by discussing the main sources available for the creation of the first legal collections between the seventh and the fifth century B.C.E., namely, the traditions about the ‘nomothetes’ as well as the inscriptive evidence, especially the Gortyn Code. She concludes from this survey that the sources point to a trend toward ‘codification’ during this period (in the sense of the writing down and organization of various laws around a common topic), but that such codification always remains partial rather than comprehensive. She then analyzes the innovation introduced by the public writing of laws and its relationship to oral laws. She notes, in particular, that the written and oral laws have different and – at least to an extent – complementary functions, and that the writing down of laws often takes place in a context of social conflicts, the role of the written law being then to ‘stabilize’ social relations. Following these remarks, Ruzé returns to the question of the paucity of written laws before the fifth century B.C.E. She argues, in particular, that this phenomenon reveals key aspects about the relationship between oral and written laws in archaic Greece, which she comprehensively discusses. At the end of her essay, Ruzé also points to the implications of this observation for the notion of ‘codification’ as it is applied to Greek laws.

The essay by Gary N. Knoppers (p. 50–77) presents a rich discussion of the parallels between the traditions about Greek lawgivers and the eastern Mediterranean world, specifi-
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Knoppers begins by reviewing the typical features that characterize the great lawgivers in the Greek tradition such as, e.g., their rigorous training, their virtue, or the challenges that the new legislation they sought to impose had to face. He then discusses the question of whether, and to what extent, the resulting typology can be applied to the figures of lawgivers elsewhere in the ancient Mediterranean, especially to Moses. He argues, in particular, that while the divine origin of the legislation associated with Moses (the Torah) signals a basic difference between Greek and Israelite legal traditions and their authoritative figures, the line between these two legal traditions should not be drawn too rigidly (contra Szegedy-Maszak): first, because the relationship between divine and human roles in the origins of the law is more complex and more nuanced in the biblical traditions than it has sometimes been assumed; and second, because the notion of the divine origin of the law is not unknown either in the Greek traditions about lawgivers. Based on these remarks, Knoppers proceeds to a detailed discussion of the parallels between Moses and Greek lawgivers (p. 63–69 of his essay). He concludes that the parallels are as significant as the differences that can be observed, and that this observation, in turn, calls for a study of ancient lawgivers that is not merely restricted to the Greek cities but takes into account the larger Mediterranean context.

The first part of this volume concludes with the essay by Sandra Lippert (p. 78–98), which provides a comprehensive discussion of the evidence for the compilation of a legal code in Egypt under Darius I. Diodorus Siculus (I.75), whose information appears to be based on pre-Ptolemaic sources, mentions that the creation of the Egyptian judiciary goes back to six legislator kings, the last of whom was Darius, and that the Egyptian legislation was contained in eight books used in tribunals. The narrative preserved in a portion of Papyrus BN 215 verso (column c, lines 6–16) documents the command given by Darius to his satrap to collect, write down and organize Egyptian laws into sections (up to the 26th dynasty), as well as to provide an Aramaic translation of these laws. According to Lippert, the ascription to Darius would make little sense under the Ptolemies. Hence there is no reason to question the historicity of this narrative. The second part of her essay analyzes various sources that arguably reflect the contents of this code. Her survey includes, in particular, manuscripts preserving Demotic versions of the Egyptian laws, such as the Codex Hermopolis or the so-called ‘Zivilprozeßordnung’, which she identifies as copies of Darius’ code, as well as other manuscripts that can be interpreted as commentaries on the laws of this code. She also compares these sources to the evidence available from trial records. She concludes that the available evidence warrants the existence of an Egyptian codification, presumably going back to Darius I; and that this codification, which was initially translated in Aramaic in the Persian period, was probably translated later into Greek under the Ptolemies and continued to be copied under the Roman administration up to the second century C.E.

The second part of the volume, which focuses on ritual laws, opens with the essay by Pierre Brulé (p. 101–116). In this insightful piece, Brulé addresses the question of the so-called ‘sacred laws’ from the perspective of the evidence regarding deliberations on religious matters in the Greek cities. The first part of his essay highlights the distinction between hiéra and hosia in classical sources describing the functioning of deliberative assemblies in Greek cities (especially, albeit not exclusively, Athens). The relationship bet-
ween hiéra and hosia remains somewhat unclear in these sources; what is clear is that the hiéra were usually discussed first in the assemblies. The second part of the essay highlights further aspects of the hiéra and their place in the deliberations of the assemblies. Brulé notes that the majority of the ‘sacred laws’ originate in the institutions of the politeia; while in Athens (and presumably elsewhere as well) the number of decrees concerning the hiéra is proportionally low (about 5% of the total number of decrees according to Brulé), the epigraphic record suggests that these decrees were often published. In addition, Brulé notes, the distinction between ‘sacred’ and other matters is not always easily established in these decrees. The third and last part of the essay specifies the meaning of hosia through the analysis of the expression περί τε τὰ θεία καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα in various documents dealing with the attribution of politeia to an individual or a collectivity. Brulé concludes that, even though the lexical and semantic field of hosia remains difficult to circumscribe, the term appears to denote human matters (whereas hiéra, for its part, belongs to the field of divine matters). Based on this, he argues, the rendering of hosia with ‘profane’, and even the notion of a distinction – but not an opposition – between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ in Greece, are not without relevance.

The next essay, by Anselm Hagedorn (p. 117–140), offers a wide-ranging comparison between Greek and biblical laws. After surveying the state of the discussion, his essay compares and contrasts both legal traditions in light of two related issues: the involvement of the gods in writing laws (and other materials), as well as the sacred character of the law. With regard to the first issue, Hagedorn shows that even though the references to Yhwh’s writing activity are comparatively limited with respect to the evidence for writing gods elsewhere in the ancient Near East, the characterization of Yhwh as the author or writer of Israelite laws plays a key role in the Pentateuch, especially in the late stages of the formation of this collection. By contrast, the references to writing gods are marginal at best in Greece, and Greek gods are never presented as the authors of the written laws. This contrast points to a more basic difference in the understanding of the relationship between the gods and the laws in both cultures, which is explored in the next part of Hagedorn’s essay. Here, Hagedorn begins by noting that the biblical law codes are intrinsically religious documents and that this aspect also permeates the depiction of Moses as lawgiver, in contrast to Greek lawgivers. Following these remarks, he then discusses the role of the gods and the place of sacred or religious issues in various laws from the Gortyn Code, as well as in the law of Selinus. As he notes in conclusion, the comparison highlights first and foremost the differences between Greek and biblical laws. While the written law may be viewed in both cultures as an ‘identity marker’, the status and meaning of these laws with regard to the community and its god(s) remain markedly distinct. In particular, the scribal processes underlying the composition and revision of the biblical laws “removes the law from human activity” (p. 132) in a way that is unparalleled in the Greek world.

The final essay, by Jan-Mathieu Carbon and Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge (p. 141–157), provides a detailed and thorough reassessment of the notion of ‘sacred laws’ in ancient Greece and their codification. After noting the disparate character of this collection as well as the issues involved with the terms ‘sacred laws’, and after surveying the state of the discussion, the first part of their essay discusses the terminology used for ritual norms in these documents. Based on various examples, they show that the terms used (lie, e.g., patria or nomoi) are often fluid, and therefore make it difficult to identify a clear-cut classi-
fication (or ‘stratigraphy’ to use A. Chaniotis’ terminology) within these norms. This finding leads Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge to raise a related question in the second part of their essay, namely, whether the Greeks themselves had a specific expression to denote ‘sacred laws’ or ‘sacred traditions’. Special attention is given in this context to the expression *hieros nomos*: based on a comprehensive survey of the occurrences of this phrase in various sources, Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge show that, except for those cases where *hieros nomos* explicitly refers to a written norm, in all other instances a reference to ‘sacred custom’ or ‘sacred tradition’ cannot be ruled out. The fluidity evinced by this category reflects the diversity of usages characteristic of Greek city-states and sanctuaries, within which the formalization and codification of *hieroi nomoi* as written norms (or ‘sacred laws’) should be seen as a specific case. Connected to this point, the third part of the essay addresses the relationship between the written norm and ritual customs. Against a common view, the authors show that, based on the epigraphic evidence, the written prescriptions do not exclusively concern deviations from, or exceptions to, the ritual norm: “Except in the case of the most basic forms of sacrifice, ritual norms could indeed be codified in some detail, such as one finds in the patria of the Praxiergidai, or at Selinous. That a background or oral, unrecorded norms still remained behind these texts need not imply that their content was always exceptional or new” (p. 154). In conclusion, the authors highlight the need for a comprehensive reexamination of this material and the terminology used to describe it; ‘ritual norms’, while not entirely unproblematic, may arguably provide a better descriptor than ‘sacred laws’.

3. Some Perspectives for Future Discussion

Finally, by way of conclusion to this short introduction, we would like to outline some key issues that emerge from the essays collected in this volume – issues which have significant implications for future discussions on written laws in ancient society from a comparative perspective.

(1) The first issue concerns the relationship between written and unwritten laws, which is centrally addressed in several essays of this volume (see, especially, the essays by S. Démare-Lafont, for cuneiform laws, as well as by F. Ruzé, P. Brulé, and J.-M. Carbon and V. Pirenne-Delforge, for Greek laws). It is now clear that there was no linear development from unwritten to written laws in ancient societies, and that in most cases the written law did not merely replace unwritten norms, or customs, but rather coexisted alongside them. The essays in this volume highlight the complexities of the relationship between written and unwritten laws, and provide some significant pointers for future comparisons of the relationship between written and unwritten laws in ancient societies. In particular, some essays suggest that a number of common assumptions regarding the function of written laws are problematic and need to be reassessed; this is the case, for instance, for the idea that the written law would only codify exceptions to or deviations from the (oral) norm or

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15 Although this issue has been the subject of discussion, there is no compelling reason in our opinion to reserve or restrict the term ‘law’ to written laws exclusively. This division is not supported by ancient terminology (compare, e.g., the Greek term *nomos*, or the Hebrew term *tôrah*, which can equally designate written or unwritten laws), and appears to project a modern understanding of the ‘law’ as referring to a written corpus.